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Résumé Français 
 
Bien que l’imagerie motrice positive ait été bien étudiée et est utilisée en réhabilitation, l’effet 
de l’imagerie motrice négative est beaucoup moins connu. Le but de cette recherche était de 
définir si l’intention et/ou l’imagerie motrice négative serait en mesure de réduire l’effet d’une 
stimulation magnétique transcrânienne (SMT) sur le cortex moteur. Vingt participants ont reçu 
trente stimulations de SMT dans trois situations différentes : En restant passif, en portant une 
attention particulière aux sensations dans leur main ou en tentant de réduire l’effet de la SMT. 
La moitié des participants ont utilisé une stratégie d’imagerie motrice, l’autre moitié leur 
intention. Dans les deux cas, l’amplitude dans la condition de modulation n’a pas été réduite 
de façon significative.  
 
 
Mots Clés Français 
 
TMS, modulation, cortex moteur, volonté, main, imagerie motrice, électromyographie, 
humains, activité/activation motrice, performance psychomotrice 
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Résumé Anglais 
 
Although positive motor imagery has been widely studied and is used in rehabilitation, the 
effect of negative motor imagery on our motor system is less well understood. Our goal was to 
ascertain whether intention and/or negative visual imagery is effective in decreasing the twitch 
resulting from transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) over the primary motor cortex. 
Twenty participants received 30 TMS stimulations in three different conditions: remaining 
passive, paying particular attention to the sensations in their hand, and attempting to modulate 
the amplitude of the resulting movement. To do this, half the participants used an imagery 
strategy, whereas the other half used an intention strategy. In both cases, amplitude in the 
modulation condition was not significantly reduced.  
 
 
Mots Clés Anglais 
 
TMS, modulation, motor cortex, volition, hand, motor imagery, electromyography, humans, 
motor activity/activation, psychomotor performance 
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Introduction 
Transcranial magnetic stimulation 
Transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) works through Faraday’s principles of 
electromagnetic induction (Pascual-Leone, Walsh & Rothwell, 2000). An electric current 
creates a magnetic field, which induces current in the brain and stimulates neural tissue. The 
neural tissue then fires a rapid series of impulses, followed by a period of deactivation 
(Bolognini & Ro, 2010). For a single pulse, this whole process takes anywhere between 20 
and 200ms depending on the strength of the initial pulse (Pascual-Leone et al., 2000). TMS 
has a range of spatial and temporal resolutions. It is possible to change the coil size, and thus 
the size of the area TMS stimulates, the intensity of the current as well as the repetition of the 
current (Bolognini & Ro, 2010). Its effect is most often of disrupting function, although with 
repetitive TMS, it is also possible to enhance functionality, although only temporarily (Huang, 
Edwards, Rounis, Bhatia, & Rothwell, 2005). TMS has mostly been used to define the 
relationships between focal activity and behavior (Pascual-Leone et al., 2000). In contrast to 
imaging techniques, which permit the establishment of correlations between brain areas and 
function, TMS allows an attribution of causality. Because a TMS pulse can disrupt function at 
specific times during an action, the establishment of timelines for cortical regions implicated 
in certain actions is also possible (Pascual-Leone et al. 2000). 
In contrast to actual lesions, the temporary functional lesions caused by TMS are not 
individually variable or compensated for by plasticity. It provides an interesting control for 
understanding compensatory and plasticity mechanisms in patients with lesions. In this way, 
TMS also helps map functional connectivity. Other new applications with patients are 
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emerging: TMS holds the possibility for functional enhancement as well. For instance, in 
stroke patients, it was found that stimulating the non-affected M1 with rTMS helped improve 
motor function in the affected hand (Takeuchi, Chuma, Matsuo, Watanabe, & Ikoma, 2005).  
However, despite these applications for TMS, there are certain limitations. First of all, TMS 
can only be applied to surface areas underlying the scalp. Second, it is not possible to know, 
without in vivo recordings, exactly how much cortical area is affected. The spread and extent 
of the current can also be variable and is impossible to assess. Finally, because of the loud 
click and scalp sensations TMS can produce, it is important to include these in control 
conditions, making it hard to design a sham condition that is credible to experimental subjects 
(Bolognini & Ro, 2010).  
Because the primary motor cortex (BA 4) lies on gyri and sulci at the surface of the brain, it is 
easily accessible to TMS. In fact, using TMS on the motor cortex permits the study of 
different motor processes. A single pulse activates direct and indirect corticospinal neurons, 
resulting in D-waves (direct) and I-waves (indirect; activated via interneurons) measured at the 
level of the cervical spinal cord (Houlden, Schwartz, Tator, Ashby, & Mackay, 1999). These 
different waves then activate motoneurons that innervate the muscle. I-waves are 
preferentially evoked, reflect excitability, are of trans-synaptic origin (Nakamura, Kitagawa, 
Kawaguchi, & Tsuji, 1997), and are the primary source of input to hand muscles (Houlden et 
al., 1999). 
When a single TMS pulse is strong enough (over the Motor Threshold), the muscle at the end 
of the pathway of neurons is triggered and creates an involuntary movement. The single pulse 
lasts 100 microseconds, includes both inhibitory and excitatory phenomena (Nakamura et al. 
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1997) and is proven to be completely safe when certain precautions are taken (Rossi, Hallett, 
Rossini, & Pascual-Leone, 2009). The muscle activity induced by a single TMS pulse (MEP, 
motor evoked potential, measured by electromyography (EMG)) is the result of motor cortex 
excitatory effects (Nakamura et al. 1997). By comparing MEP activity between different 
experimental conditions, conclusions can be drawn about what affects corticospinal 
excitability.  
Paired pulse TMS demonstrates that both inhibitory and excitatory effects are active at the 
cortical level. Two pulses (one under the motor threshold and the other above) are fired at 
different intervals. When the first stimulus is under the motor threshold and is followed by a 
second, suprathreshold pulse 2-5ms later, inhibition occurs. This is thought to be mediated by 
GABA-A mechanisms and is called short interval cortical inhibition (SICI). When both pulses 
are suprathreshold and at an interval of 100-200ms a different type of inhibition occurs, 
mediated by GABA-B mechanisms (Nakamura et al. 1997). Because of its longer interval, it is 
called long interval corticali (LICI). Finally, when the first stimulus is under the motor 
threshold and is followed by a second, suprathreshold pulse 7-15ms later, intracortical 
facilitation (ICF) occurs.  
TMS of the motor cortex thus activates a downward network of neurons: cortical, 
interneurons, corticospinal neurons (Shibasaki, 2012), and finally the muscle whose activity is 
measurable by EMG. Action does not start in M1, however. Many cortical and subcortical 
structures have connections to M1. In this way, higher cognitive functions, but also 
environmental cues can modulate activity in M1. In fact, Haggard (2008) distinguishes 
between two different networks that end at M1: one for voluntary actions and one for 
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stimulus-based reactions. In essence, voluntary actions recruit the prefrontal cortex, pre-
supplementary motor area (preSMA) and the supplementary motor area (SMA), the basal 
ganglia and finally M1. In contrast, a secondary network that has sensory guidance as a role 
uses the premotor cortex, the primary sensory area and parietal cortex (Haggard, 2008).  This 
aspect of volition influencing M1 offers an interesting question as to whether it is possible to 
intentionally increase or decrease the downward M1 network when a TMS pulse is applied.  
Corticospinal Excitability (CSE) 
Corticospinal excitability refers to a state of reactivity of the entire motor system, including 
motoneurons at the cortical and spinal levels. Klein-Flügge, Nobbs, Pitcher, and Bestmann 
(2013) contend that variability in corticospinal excitability tracks the state of action 
preparation. 
Variability in corticospinal excitability is most often measured over different trials at the 
muscular level. Usually, EMG is used to measure MEPs at the level of the muscle. This gives 
a measure of how excitable the cortico-spinal system is. It is possible to separate the unique 
contribution of spinal neurons by using catheter electrodes in cases of spinal surgery (Kaneko 
et al., 1998) or by eliciting the H-reflex, a more accessible technology. The H-reflex is evoked 
by electrically stimulating afferent nerves, which produces a reflex that activates the 
motoneurons and results in efferent motor nerve activation. EMG responses result in an M-
wave at 3-6ms, an H-wave at 28-35ms and an F-wave that taken together give an indication of 
the excitability of motoneurons at the spinal level (Fisher, 1992; Palmieri, Ingersoll, & 
Hoffman, 2004). Many networks in the brain converge on M1 and have a role in determining 
motor output. These networks and their functions thus play a role in increasing or decreasing 
corticospinal excitability.  
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Factors that increase corticospinal excitability (CSE).  
A number of different cognitive and emotional processes play a significant role in modulating 
corticospinal excitability. Observation of others performing actions, negative emotions, worry, 
as well as mental imagery are all known to increase corticospinal excitability.  
Observation. Observing others moving acts as a preparation for the motor cortex, and 
increases corticospinal excitability (Williams, Pearce, Loporto, Morris, & Holmes, 2009). 
Corticospinal excitability increases preferentially with the observation of biological actions, 
especially when the actions are transitive (i.e. object-related, goal-directed movements; 
Enticott, Kennedy, Bradshaw, Rinehart, & Fitzgerald, 2010), providing support for the notion 
that intentionality may play a role in action observation and preparation. Along the same lines, 
when an action is first observed, then imitated, subsequent observed actions show even higher 
increases in corticospinal excitability (Sakamoto, Muraoka, Mizuguchi, & Kanusue, 2009). 
This effect does not exist when the executed action differs too much from the observed action.   
Emotion. Emotional stimuli can also increase action preparation. Both unpleasant emotional 
visual stimuli (Coelho, Lipp, Marinovic, Wallis, & Riek, 2010; Coombes et al. 2009) and 
unpleasant emotional auditory stimuli (Komeilipoor, Pizzolato, Daffertshofer, & Cesari, 2013) 
have been shown to increase corticospinal excitability. For example, worrying has been shown 
to increase corticospinal excitability (Oathes, Bruce, & Nitschke, 2008). 
Motor imagery. Motor Imagery refers to the simulation of a movement in one’s mind, without 
sending direct motor commands to the related muscles (Hétu et al., 2013). There are many 
types of motor imagery. The most common are visual imagery, kinesthetic imagery and 
laterality judgments. Visual imagery consists in imagining seeing oneself doing an action, 
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either from a first person or a third person perspective. Kinesthetic imagery refers to 
imagining feeling oneself doing the movement. Munzert, Lorey, & Zentgraf (2009) point out 
that visual imagery is focused on external aspects, whereas kinesthetic imagery is more 
focused on internal states. Laterality judgment tasks, on the other hand, are a more implicit 
measure of motor imagery. Subjects are asked to report the laterality of a body part presented 
visually in different angular orientations. In order to answer the questions, individuals 
mentally rotate their own body parts and match them to the presented image (Parsons, 1994; 
2003). 
There is a general consensus that motor imagery shares important neural circuitry with 
movement observation and movement execution (Lepage, Saint-Amour, & Théoret, 2008; 
Hétu et al. 2013; Grezes & Decety, 2001; Jeannerod, 1995; Munzert et al., 2009). Indeed, a 
meta-analysis conducted by Hétu et al. (2013) reveals that motor imagery recruits a network of 
fronto-parietal as well as subcortical regions. In the parietal cortex, the inferior parietal lobule 
(IPL), supramarginal gyrus and superior parietal lobule (SPL) are consistently activated (Hétu 
et al., 2013). These regions project to pre-motor and motor areas and are an important sensory 
integration hub. The parietal cortex contains internal models and representations (Buxbaum, 
Johnson-Frey, & Bartlett-Williams, 2005). The premotor areas they project to (such as the 
inferior frontal gyrus and the supplementary motor area (SMA)) are consistently reported to be 
activated during motor execution (Fogassi & Luppino, 2005; Wise, Boussaoud, Johnson, & 
Caminiti, 1997). 
In addition, motor imagery recruits subcortical regions such as the basal ganglia, putamen and 
pallidum, which are linked to the selection of motor programs during motor execution. Motor 
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imagery also recruits cerebellar regions such as the vermis and lobules VI and VII, which are 
involved in several types of movement (Hétu et al., 2013; Mottolese et al., 2013). 
Although motor imagery and movement execution share important neural circuitry, a meta-
analysis by Hétu et al. (2013) revealed an important difference. They report that M1 was not 
consistently activated by motor imagery in neuroimaging studies.  In fact, they found that only 
18% of the surveyed studies reported M1 activation. Although this result is consistent with the 
definition of motor imagery: “simulation in one’s mind of a movement, but without the 
explicit movement”, this finding is a matter of debate because it is inconsistent with TMS 
studies that clearly show that motor imagery affects corticospinal excitability (Fadiga et al., 
1998; Stinear, Byblow, Steyvers, Leven, & Swinnen, 2006; Bufalari, Sforza, Cesari, Aglioti, 
& Fourkas, 2010; Bonnard, Spieser, Meziane, De Graaf, & Pailhous, 2009). It is possible that 
M1 activity is not observed in neuroimaging studies because of fMRI’s lack of sensitivity and 
temporal resolution. Because participants are completely still in an fMRI, M1 may generally 
be underactivated. Even if a small area of M1 is activated during a motor imagery task, the 
effect may be drowned by the general inactivation of surrounding areas. One way to get 
around this problem is to define M1 as a region of interest; one study did this and found 
activity in M1 (Sharma, Jones, Carpenter, & Baron, 2008), although participants were motor 
imagery experts. On the other hand, it is also possible that studies that report M1 involvement 
comprised participants that actually performed the movement while they were imagining it  
(Hétu et al. 2013).  
Motor imagery appears to affect the corticospinal excitability of the muscles involved in the 
imagined movement, but not in every case. Most studies examining the motor imagery of 
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simple movements found that corticospinal excitability increased for those muscles targeted 
by the mental image (Stinear & Byblow, 2003; Stinear et al., 2006; Fadiga et al., 1998). 
Moreover, in a mental rotation study, a variation of a laterality judgment task, a TMS induced 
disruption of the M1 hand area delayed answers about hand rotations more than foot rotations, 
indicating that the primary motor cortex is causally involved in mental rotation tasks and that 
mental rotation tasks are specific to the rotated body part (Ganis, Keenan, Kosslyn, & Pascual-
Leone, 2000). However, the effects of motor imagery on corticospinal excitability are not 
limited by the feasibility of the movement. For example, Bufalari et al. (2010) asked subjects 
to imagine impossible and possible movements. Although motor imagery was not limited by 
feasibility, it was specific to the muscles involved in the impossible movement. That being 
said, some results show that motor imagery for one body part can increase corticospinal 
excitability for another, attesting to the interconnectedness of M1 (Sehm, Kipping, Schäfer, 
Villringer, & Ragert, 2013). In sum, corticospinal excitability increases are not necessarily 
specific to the muscles implicated in the imagined movement. Rather, excitability effects seem 
to spread through M1.  
Another important point to mention is that different strategies of motor imagery recruit 
different areas in the brain. Kinesthetic imagery seems to recruit the left premotor (IFG and 
precentral gyrus) and parietal cortex (IPL and pre cuneus) more than visual imagery (Hétu et 
al. 2013). Interestingly, Guillot et al. (2008) showed that good and bad motor imagers recruit 
different areas of the brain. People who are good at motor imagery recruit the parietal and 
ventromedial premotor cortices (the sensory guidance circuit), whereas people who are bad at 
it recruit the cerebellum as well as orbitofrontal and posterior cingulate cortex (the voluntary 
system). Considering that parietal regions are known to be sensorimotor integration hubs and 
 9 
that kinesthetic strategies where one must focus on what it feels like to perform an action 
recruit these regions, it is not surprising that kinesthetic strategies are more efficient in 
increasing corticospinal excitability than others (Stinear et al. 2006; but see Fourkas, 
Avenanti, Urgesi & Aglioti, 2006).  
Finally, it is also known that certain specific factors contribute to a better modulation of 
corticospinal excitability. The vividness of movement imagery questionnaire-2 measures the 
ability to make vivid images of movement. It was shown to be related to motor imagery ability 
and to TMS-induced MEP amplitudes during motor imagery (Williams, Pearce, Loporto, 
Morris, & Holmes, 2012). This demonstrates that some people are better than others at 
modulating their corticospinal excitability through motor imagery. Collet, Guillot, Lebon, 
MacIntyre, and Moran (2004) also developed a measure based on different skills 
(psychophysiological, chronometric, psychometric and qualitative) to assess motor imagery 
capacity. Hétu et al. (2013) further reveal that there may be age, sex, motor expertise and 
practice effects modulating individual differences.  
Factors that decrease cortico-spinal excitability   
To our knowledge, five TMS studies have examined factors that decrease corticospinal 
excitability. Using different strategies and experimental designs, each shows that it is possible 
to down-regulate corticospinal excitability and the TMS-induced movement. 
Relaxation seems to diminish excitability at both the cortical and spinal levels. Fujisawa et al. 
(2010) demonstrated that a 3-hour relaxation period diminished both MEPs and F-waves. 
After a 3-hour relaxation period, both measures were significantly below baseline levels. 
However, when incorporating motor imagery into the 3-hour relaxation period, F-wave 
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measures returned to 94% of the baseline level and MEP levels returned to 77% of baseline 
levels. This shows that both relaxation and motor imagery operate at the cortical level as well 
as spinal levels.   
Sohn, Wiltz, and Hallett (2002) set out to examine the specific cortical processes involved in 
relaxation. To do so, they used a go/no-go paradigm. Upon a cue, participants reacted quickly 
either by staying relaxed (no-go) or producing a movement (go). TMS was triggered at the 
average response time of a practice condition. There was no reaction task in the control 
condition. They measured activity in two muscles: extensor indicis proprius (EIP) and 
abducutor digiti minimi (ADM) in 7 participants. They found that in the No-go task, SICI 
increased in both EIP and ADM, whereas in the go task SICI was reduced only in EIP. LICI 
was reduced in both conditions, but ICF was not altered in either condition. It thus seems that 
LICI and SICI are differentially involved in the execution and suppression of voluntary 
movements. 
Sohn, Dang & Hallett (2003) then performed a slightly altered experiment. This time, they 
contrasted positive imagery with relaxation in a go/no-go task. Instead of triggering TMS at 
the average response time, TMS would occur 2 seconds after the cue. This eliminated the 
aspect of quick reaction in the previous paradigm. They also examined different muscles: first 
dorseal interosseus (FDI) and abductor pollicis brevis (APB) in addition to ADM. They 
examined these processes using both single and paired-pulse TMS. Relaxation reduced MEP 
size compared to the control condition. The reducing effect of relaxation was specific to FDI, 
as ADM and APB MEP size was not reduced significantly. Neither the inhibitory mechanisms 
of SICI or LICI, nor the excitatory effects of ICF explained this effect, as there was no change 
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between conditions. That being said, contrary to Fujisawa et al. (2010), they concluded that 
relaxation operates on a cortical level, for there were no differences in F-waves observed 
between conditions. Furthermore, they did not find significant increases in MEPs for positive 
imagery. This may be due to the fact that they only observed seven volunteers, for fewer trials 
than in the relaxation condition and that they used the left hand, since the right motor cortex is 
thought to be more involved in inhibitory processes than the left hemisphere (Fadiga et al., 
1998). 
In contrast, Bonnard, Camus, De Graaf and Pailhous (2003) examined the left hemisphere. 
This team examined the interaction between cognitive and motor processes by superimposing 
a TMS pulse on top of a voluntary movement. The participants flexed their wrist to the rhythm 
of a metronome. In order to examine the effect of intention, the participants were instructed, 
upon a cue, to either resist the movement about to occur through TMS by thinking, or to let it 
go. It was found to be possible to diminish both the movement and the MEPs in the intention 
condition. In this experiment, it is noted that although participants were able to resist the TMS, 
they did not believe they would be able to do so. Also, it was taxing cognitively and they had 
feedback and encouragement from the researchers who were monitoring the results on-line. 
Considering the contribution of emotional factors to corticospinal excitability, this could be an 
important contributing factor to the pattern of results.  
In a follow up study, Bonnard et al. (2009) used electroencephalography (EEG) to understand 
the processes underlying this inhibitory mechanism. Although cortical activation (alpha-
oscillation power) remained constant, cortical excitability (CNV) in central nodes (FC1, C1, 
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Cz) decreased when participants prepared to resist the effect of TMS. After TMS occurred, 
inhibitory processes (N100) increased in this condition. 
In conclusion, relaxation and intention tasks seem to reduce corticospinal excitability. It is not 
clear which inhibitory mechanism mediates this response and whether these tasks affect 
corticospinal excitability specifically in the muscles involved in imagery. Finally, although 
these experiments examined whether corticospinal excitability could be intentionally 
decreased, their experiments did not examine negative motor imagery, where participants are 
asked to simulate the absence of movement in their mind. 
Attention 
Another group of researchers led by Conte et al. (2008), examined the effects of attentional 
processes on MEPs resulting from paired pulse TMS and rTMS, but not from single pulse 
TMS. They found that ICF, SICI and LICI were not affected by attentional levels, but that 
MEP facilitation resulting from rTMS did occur. They suggest that attention has an effect 
when stimulation entrains neural circuits made of large numbers of cortical cells with plastic 
properties. 
Subjective Experience 
TMS has been used in many studies of motor imagery, but the subjective experience thereof 
has never been examined. More specifically, the sense of agency and control is interesting to 
examine in this context. Agency refers to the sense that one is the initiator of an action 
(Synofzik, Vosgerau, & Newen, 2007). Control, on the other hand, refers to the sense that the 
movement was under one’s command. Because single pulse TMS of the motor cortex 
produces involuntary twitches, it is fair to expect participants to have no sense of agency for 
the movement. However, if participants down-modulate their corticospinal excitability 
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effectively and thus stop the movement from occurring through their efforts, we may expect 
the sense of “I did that” to increase.  
The classical comparator model of agency (Frith, Blakemore, & Wolpert, 2000; Blakemore, 
Wolpert, & Frith, 2002) predicts that an intended movement will be compared with the 
feedback of the actual movement. When the intended and actual movements match, agency is 
felt. When the movements don’t, there is no sense of agency.  Synofzik et al. (2007) have 
suggested that agency is twofold: there is a judgment component and a feeling component of 
agency. The judgment component is of a higher order (Moore, Middleton, Haggard, & 
Fletcher, 2012) and is the judgment of “I did that”. In contrast, the feeling component is non-
conceptual (Synofzik et al., 2007), and more of an implicit sense of control over an action. 
Moore et al. (2012) support this model. Using a paradigm from the field of learning, they 
created one measure for implicit agency (using intentional binding) and another for explicit 
agency (using the Gambler’s fallacy). The explicit measure consisted in predicting if the next 
action participants did would be followed by a tone or not. The implicit measure consisted in 
estimating how close in time the action and the tone were. Both implicit and explicit measures 
changed depending on the previous trials. However, they did not change in the same way, 
showing that they were not the same, and indeed measuring two different constructs.  
Another improvement on the model came from Chambon & Haggard (2012). They were able 
to show that a sense of agency does not only occur in retrospect. In fact, when the selection of 
an action is smoother (primed compatibly rather than incompatibly), the sense of agency 
increases for the result of that action, independently of the outcome.  
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Objectives 
Previous studies have shown that intention and relaxation can have the effect of diminishing 
corticospinal excitability. However, each of the experimental tasks was complex and included 
many factors that were unessential to the research question. Studies by Bonnard et al. (2003; 
2009) observed the interaction between cognitive and motor functions by asking participants 
to superpose an intention about a TMS-pulse applied during a self-produced movement. They 
also encouraged their participants. In the Sohn et al. (2002; 2003) studies, relaxation was 
produced on cue. The alternative was to use positive imagery, and there may have been a 
different type of inhibition at play. Finally, Fujisawa et al. (2010) studied the effects of three-
hour relaxation periods. In the present experiments, we aimed at stripping down the 
experimental design to examine the effects of simple intention and negative imagery on 
corticospinal excitability. We were also interested in investigating the effects of attention on 
MEPs when elicited by single pulse TMS. Conte et al. (2008) observed the effects of paired 
and repeated TMS only, reporting that paired TMS had no effect on MEPs but that rTMS did. 
 To investigate these questions, participants were subjected to 30 TMS pulses in three different 
conditions: control, attention and modulation. Twenty participants were separated into two 
groups. Each group used a different strategy to modulate corticospinal excitability: 1) negative 
visual imagery; and 2) intention. Different strategies have been shown to be effective in 
positive imagery (Stinear et al., 2006), but not in negative imagery. Furthermore, although 
intention had been shown to have an effect on corticospinal excitability (Bonnard et al. 2003; 
2009), whether this effect would also occur when the intention was not superposed on a self-
produced movement was not known. Negative visual imagery in the way we define it 
(imagining the hand not reacting to the TMS pulse) on the other hand, has to our knowledge 
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never been studied. Studies claiming to observe negative motor imagery were in fact studying 
relaxation. As positive visual imagery is an effective strategy to increase corticospinal 
excitability, we hypothesized that participants would be successful in modulating MEPs with 
the negative motor imagery strategy and that the MEPs would be smaller in the modulation 
condition than in the control condition. Furthermore, we expected to replicate the Bonnard et 
al. (2003; 2009) results that intention decreases corticospinal excitability. Finally, considering 
that motor imagery seems to be an individual ability (Collet et al., 2004), we hypothesized that 
there would be a correlation between the ability to modulate excitability and answers on 
questionnaires about body awareness, mindfulness, and self-regulation. Above and beyond the 
ability to visualize, our objective was to identify psychological factors that correlate with the 
ability to regulate corticospinal excitability.  
To get a fuller grasp of the subjective experience of TMS induced involuntary movements, we 
also studied the judgment of amplitude and specificity of the motor twitch induced by TMS, in 
order to determine how the subjective experience of such a movement is constructed. At each 
pulse, we recorded data pertaining to the subjective experience of a TMS-induced movement. 
We examined agency, control, specificity and amplitude (Appendix 1). These results are 
mostly the subject of another report (Dumont, 2013). 
Methods 
Ethical Considerations 
Participants gave their written informed consent to the experimental procedure that was 
approved by the Comité d’éthique de la recherche de la Faculté des Arts et des Sciences 
(CÉRFAS) of Université de Montréal. Ethical Certificate (Number CÉRFAS-2011-12-232-A) 
was obtained February 15th, 2012 and was renewed the next year at the same date. A copy of 
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the certificate can be found in Appendix 2 and a copy of the consent form in Appendix 3. The 
safety protocol defined by Rossi and colleagues (2009) was respected. All participants were 
compensated for their time ($20).  
It is important to mention that 30 subjects were tested, but 10 were excluded from the study. 
An incident occurred with the 11th participant on May 8, 2012. Experimentation stopped at 
once when the participant signaled his discomfort. Quickly after, this subject had a vasovagal 
syncope. First aid emergency services were contacted. The participant was accompanied home 
when he felt better. This incident was not attributed to TMS, for the participant had not yet 
eaten and was lacking sleep. The participant was contacted the next day to make sure he was 
well. This incident was reported to the ethics committee, and the project was cleared to 
continue. 
After this episode, for the next ten participants, instructions were changed and the possibility 
of an adverse reaction to TMS was stressed more directly. In fact, this appears to have had 
consequences for the experiment. Because worry significantly affects corticospinal excitability 
(Oathes et al. 2008), instability in experimental conditions may have occured. Indeed, results 
from the second group of ten participants differed significantly from the first group of ten. A 
decision was made to exclude these participants and include another ten participants, as well 
as to revert to the instructions used with the first ten subjects. This is the group presented in 
the subsequent analyses. 
Subjects 
The final sample comprised 20 participants. They were recruited at Université de Montréal. 
The mean age of participants was 22.9 (standard deviation: 2.51) and 10 were female. They 
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were mostly undergraduates with an annual income between $0 and $15 000. For 17/20 
participants, the mother tongue was French. The other three participants (mother tongues 
German, Vietnamese and Dutch) all had a CÉGEP diploma in French. The participants had no 
psychiatric, neurological or brain trauma antecedents. They also had no history of loss of 
consciousness, epilepsy, substance abuse or addiction in the last 6 months. Furthermore, they 
did not have a cardiac stimulator, implant or tinnitus. Participants were informed of the 10% 
risk of discomfort associated with TMS, a risk of headaches or nausea.  
TMS stimulator 
The TMS system used to deliver stimulations was the Medtronic Magpro (Magstim Co., 
London, UK). It was is equipped with an 80mm coil and the current was biphasic. The coil 
was positioned flat on the head, oriented at 45⁰ from the midline, the handle pointing 
backward. It was placed directly on the scalp at M1 (C3 in the 10/20 system) and delivered 
single-pulse stimulations at a minimum interval of 10 seconds. 
Stereotactic System 
In order to maintain the stimulation site constant, a BrainSight frameless stereotactic system 
(Rogue Research, Montreal, Canada) was used. Stereotactic markers were located on special 
goggles worn by the participants and on the stimulating the coil. Stereotactic marker position 
was recorded by a hybrid Polaris position sensor (Northern Digital Inc., Ontario, Canada). The 
stereotactic system allows real time position tracking of the coil in relation to the optimal 
stimulation point.  
Data recording 
EMG. Activity in two intrinsic hand muscles was recorded: FDI and ADM. FDI was the target 
muscle of the imagery conditions whereas ADM served as a control. EMG activity was 
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recorded with all-purpose electrodes (Vermed Versa-trode, London, UK). The EMG signal 
was amplified with a bandwidth of 20-1000 Hz using a Powerlab 4/30 system 
(ADInstruments, Colorado Springs, USA). MEPs were recorded using Scope v4.0 software 
(ADInstruments, Colorado Springs, USA) and stored offline for analysis. 
OptoTrak. In addition to muscle activity, actual movement of the index finger was measured. 
Two markers located at the wrist and end of the index finger were recorded with the Optotrak 
Certus apparatus. Data was collected at a frequency of 750Hz for 10-second periods by NDI 
First Principles 1.2 (Waterloo, Canada). Data was analyzed with custom software (created 
with Matlab (Version R2010a), MathWorks, Natick, U.S.A.). Speed of the index finger 
relative to the wrist was calculated as well as the trajectory length, maximal speed, duration 
and movement latency. Data were filtered at a 60Hz low pass filter. The movement 
attributable to the index was found by subtracting the movement at the wrist from the 
movement at the index. Markers of the start and the end of the movement were automatically 
positioned. The start of the movement was marked as soon as the speed of the movement was 
10% higher than average. The end of the movement was marked by the last moment at which 
this speed occurred in a 750ms window after the start of the movement. A typical trial can be 
seen in Figure 1.  
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Figure 1: Typical Distance Trial.  
Note: The black line shows the motion detection threshold.  
Protocol 
First, participants read and signed the consent form. They were given a copy for their own 
records. Then, an in-depth explanation of the different materials and of TMS functioning was 
given. As a demonstration, the experimenters gave themselves a TMS pulse on the arm and 
explained what was occurring. With the participants’ consent, they too received a TMS pulse 
in their hand so that they could get an idea of the sensations involved without it being applied 
to the head. This explanatory period aimed at giving the participant enough time to truly 
understand what was going to happen and to formulate any questions. Participants were also 
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reminded of the possibility of stopping the experimentation at any time, should they wish to do 
so.  
Participants were seated comfortably with their hand on their lap, palm facing upwards. Some 
participants required a foam bolster on their lap for comfort. Participants were asked to keep 
their hand in sight at all times during the experiment. The equipment was installed and 
calibrated. Subjects were told that they would have four subjective questions to answer after 
each pulse. The nature and the differences between them were explained. 
The optimal site of stimulation was then defined as the coil position from which TMS 
produced MEPs of maximum amplitude in the target muscle of the controlateral hand. 
Intensity was set as the percentage of stimulator output that consitently produced MEPs of 
1mV amplitude. Twenty trial stimulations were then given at this intensity. This allows 
habituation of the response (Schmidt et al., 2009) and allows participants to get used to the 
subjective questions. Also, these twenty preparatory pulses served as a reference point for the 
judgments of amplitude of the movement produced by TMS. 
At this point, the experiment began. There were 3 conditions of 30 pulses. The control 
condition was always first to establish an uncontaminated baseline. The subjects were asked to 
simply respond to the questions without doing anything else. The two experimental conditions 
were attention and modulation, which were counterbalanced between subjects. During 
attention, participants were instructed to pay particular attention to all the sensations occurring 
in their hand. During modulation, participants were instructed to try to stop the movement 
from occurring without using their muscles. Half the participants were given the extra 
instruction to not use any visual imagery. Each pulse was separated by at least 10 seconds, so 
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that no interaction between TMS pulses would occur (Rossi et al. 2009). Between each 
condition, participants were asked about their subjective experience (Appendix 4). At the end 
of the experiment, open-ended questions about the experiment were asked, including questions 
about the similarities between conditions and the strategies they used and felt were most 
effective (Appendix 5).  
Four different questionnaires were administered to examine whether successful modulation is 
correlated with body awareness, mindfulness and self-regulation.  The questionnaires took 
about 30 minutes to complete. All questionnaires were translated from their original English to 
French and validated in different samples (Appendix 6). 
The Body Awareness Questionnaire (Shields, Mallory & Simon, 1989) is a self-report 
questionnaire that assesses attentiveness to non-emotional body processes, specifically to body 
cycles and rhythms, to the ability to detect small changes in normal functioning and the ability 
to anticipate reactions. The translation was done by our team for another part of this project 
(Dumont, Chamberland, Martin, Broer, & Beauregard, 2012). This questionnaire was shown 
not to be correlated with the Mindful Attention Awareness Scale (Brown & Ryan, 2003) and 
has a good internal validity (Cronbach-α=0.82). 
The Mindful Attention Awareness Scale (MAAS; Brown & Ryan, 2003) is a 15-item self-
report questionnaire that measures participants’ day-to-day degree of mindful behavior. 
Mindfulness is operationally defined as a “kind of non-elaborative, nonjudgmental, present-
centered awareness in which each thought, feeling, or sensation that arises in the attention 
field is acknowledged and accepted as it is” (Brown & Ryan, 2003). It was translated by 
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Jermann et al. (2009) and its psychometric properties were found to be similar to its English 
counterpart.  
Self-regulation was measured by the Self-Regulation Questionnaire (SRQ; Brown, Miller & 
Lawendowski, 1999), and the Self-Regulation Scale (Schwarzer, Diehl, & Schmitz, 1999). The 
SRQ is a self-report questionnaire that examines the ability to develop, implement and 
maintain planned behavior whereas the SRS is more focused on the attentional component of 
self-regulation. The SRQ was translated in a different part of this project (Dumont et al. 2012), 
and the SRS translation was done by Miquelon et al. (2012). The SRS internal validity is 
similar to its original english version and its unifactorial structure is preserved. 
All questionnaires were administered online either before or after the experimental session, to 
the participant’s desire. At the end of the experimentation, participants filled out a monetary 
compensation form and received $20. If the subject wished, we provided an explanation of the 
goals of the experiment. 
Subjective Questions 
After each stimulation, participants were asked to rate the resulting movement of the TMS on 
four criteria on a scale of 1 to 100. The first pertained to agency: to what extent were you the 
originator of the movement? The second to specificity: to what extent was the movement 
specific to your index finger? The third to control: How much control do you feel you had? 
The last asked to rate the amplitude of the movement.  
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Results 
Unless otherwise specified, Z-scores have been used. This allows the comparison between 
participants.  
Missing data 
64.4% of the data was missing for one of the participants’ distance measurements. These 
measurements are not included in the subsequent analyses. 
Measure correlates 
Group level. We calculated a Pearson correlation between each of the movement measures 
(FDI, ADM, and Distance). All the measures were significantly correlated with each other. 
See Table I. 
Table I Correlations Between Movement Measures 
  
FDI 
Amplitude Distance 
ADM 
Amplitude 
FDI 
Amplitude 
Pearson 
Correlation 
1 .438* .544* 
Distance Pearson 
Correlation 
 1 .274* 
Note: *:  Correlation is significant at the 0.001 level (2-
tailed). 
 
Batch effect 
Because the experimental procedure was modified starting with the 11th participant, we 
verified that the first two groups of subjects (batches) were not different from one another. A 
mixed ANOVA was performed on the average FDI amplitude measures for each participant. 
The experimental condition was a three level within subject factor and batch participation was 
a two level between subject factor. There was no significant main effect of experimental 
 24 
condition (F(2, 36) = .535, p = .590) and batch (F(1, 18) = .285, p = .285). There was, 
however, an interaction (F(2, 36) = 4.056,p= .026). 
Post-hoc two-tailed t-tests revealed that attention effects were reversed between the first two 
batches although the control and modulation conditions remained the same, as can be observed 
in table II.  
Table II  Batch Effects per Condition 
 Batch 1 Batch 2 p 
Control 0.017 0.0610 .969 
Attention 0.2520 -0.193 .006 
Modulation -0.2570 0.0610 .099 
 
Effect of the order of conditions 
To insure that the order of the conditions had no effect on the results, it was directly tested. 
The ANOVA on FDI where the experimental factor was the order of the condition revealed 
that there was no such effect (F = 0.53, p> 0.05, p= .920). 
 
Conditions 
Group level. A mixed ANOVA was conducted on the average amplitude of the MEP, where 
the experimental condition was a three level within subject factor and strategy group was a 
two level between subject factor. There was no significant main effect of experimental 
condition (F(2, 36) = 1.477, p=.242) or of strategy group (F(1, 18) = 0.945, p=.344). Finally, 
the interaction was also non-significant (F(2, 36)=1.176 , p>0.05, p=.320). 
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Individual level. Because individual differences in motor imagery ability exist, individual data 
were analyzed. T-tests comparing the modulation condition with the control condition for each 
participant were computed to determine if some participants were successful. When the t-test 
was significant (alpha < 0.05), and the average of the modulation amplitudes was lower than 
that of the control condition, we established that this individual modulated his/her response. 
This was done for the three measures estimating the movement elicited by the TMS pulse: 
amplitude of the MEP at the FDI muscle, at the ADM muscle and total distance as measured 
by motion capture. As can be seen in Table III, we found that 7 out of the 20 participants 
successfully modulated the amplitude of the MEP at FDI (the index finger) downwards in the 
modulation condition. Using distance measures of the same movement, 5/20 yielded 
significant results for the modulation condition. Finally, the ADM muscle was also modulated 
downwards in 5/20 participants. Figure 2.1 shows the number of participants who were able to 
down-regulate one, two or three of their measures. There were also participants whose 
movement measures in the control and modulation conditions were significantly different 
from each other, but in the opposite direction: the modulation condition was higher than their 
control condition.  
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Table III  Significant Differences in the Modulation 
Condition Compared to Control 
FDI Amplitude Distance ADM 
Amplitude 
  t t t 
1 -3.678**† -4.605**†¤ -1.225* 
2 -1.986¤ -1.223* -3.935**† 
3 -1.94 -1.017 -1.7 
4 -1.291 -4.469**† -4.771**† 
5 1.313 -0.751 1.061 
6 7.036**¤ 5.463**¤ 6.108**¤ 
7 1.624 1.217 0.25 
8 2.157* -1.646 -2.694*†¤ 
9 7.683**¤ 9.926**¤ 9.490** 
10 2.130*¤ 1.760¤ 1.002 
11 1.761 1.017 2.705* 
12 3.613**¤ 6.970**¤ 1.909¤ 
13 1.884 4.450**¤ 4.157** 
14 -4.789**†¤ - -4.377**†¤ 
15 2.354*¤ -1.142¤ 2.671* 
16 -2.607*†¤ -1.004¤ 1.07 
17 0.124 2.701*¤ - 
18 0.615 1.101¤ 1.987¤ 
19 2.309*¤ -1.780¤ 1.804 
20 1.237 0.452 -4.571**† 
          
Notes:   *: p<.05,  **: p<0.001 
†: Modulation condition was significantly bigger than the control condition. 
¤ :  Equal variances were not assumed (Levene’s test was significant) and 
so a correction was applied to the t-value. 
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Figure 2.1 – Distribution of Modulators per Measure 
 
 
Trial level. Bonnard et al. (2009) reported a variable “proportion of successful trials”. They 
defined a successful trial as one lying outside the range of the “normal” movement subjects 
were trained to do. We made a similar measure in two different ways. The first defined a 
successful trial as any trial in the modulation condition that was below the mean of their 
control condition. We found that, defined this way, 70% (standard deviation of 25%) of FDI 
trials were successful, 67% (standard deviation of 29%) of ADM trials were successful, and 
66% (standard deviation 29%) of distance trials were successful. Figure 2.2 shows the 
proportion of successful trials per participant.  
 
  
  
1 
1 
2 
1 
1 3 1 
ADM FDI 
Distance 
Figure 2.1 Depending on which measure you examine, the number 
of modulators changes. 7 participants were able to modulate their 
FDI muscle, 7 were able to modulate their ADM muscle and 4 were 
able to modulate their OT activity. 
Figure 2.1  Distribution of Modulators per Measure 
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The second method defined a successful trial as any trial one standard deviation below the 
mean for all trials (FDI Z-score < -1). Analysis showed that 10% (SD 16%) of FDI trials, 14% 
(SD: 18%) of ADM trials and 8% (SD: 14%) of distance trials were successful. Although 
these numbers are very low, it is important to note that we expect that 15% of trials should be 
1 standard deviation below the mean. Our results are all under 15% and thus corroborate the 
group results, showing that modulation had no effect on MEP and distances. That being said, 
these measures underscore the variability between participants. The results are shown in 
Figure 2.3. 
 
Figure 2.2  Proportion of Trials in the Modulation Condition below the 
Control Condition Mean 
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Strategy 
Individual level. A chi-square test was conducted comparing the number of FDI-modulators in 
the imagery group with the number of FDI-modulators in the non-imagery group. The Pearson 
χ2 = 5.495 was significant at p = .019. The visual imagery group was more effective than the 
non-imagery group. Indeed, 6 out of 7 FDI-modulators were in the imagery group.  
Trial level. Independent t-tests were performed comparing the two strategies on the level of 
proportions of successful trials. As can be observed in Table IV, there was a significant 
difference between strategies for ADM and distance factors when a successful trial was 
defined as a trial that was below the mean of the control condition. In fact, the proportion of 
successful trials was higher in the imagery condition every time, but was only significant on 
two measures.   
Figure 2.3  Proportion of Trials One Standard Deviation below the Mean in the 
Modulation Condition 
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Table IV  Differences Between Modulators and Non-modulators on Successful Trials 
 Method 1 Method 2 
 t Sig.(2-
tailed) 
t Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Proportion of FDI Successful Trials   -1.797 .089 -1.285 .215 
Proportion of ADM Successful 
Trials  
-2.317 .037 -1.194 .248 
Proportion of Distance Successful 
Trials  
-2.271 .036 -1.203 .254 
 
Questionnaires 
Modulators vs non-modulators. In order to find differences between participants that were 
successful or not at the modulation task, a group comprising the 7 modulators who were able 
to modulate the target muscle (FDI) was created. The participants who presented significantly 
higher FDI MEPs in the modulation condition than in the control condition were included in 
the non-modulator group. 
Independent samples t-tests were conducted comparing the non-modulator group to the 
modulator group. Table V reveals there were no significant differences between modulators 
and non-modulators at the level of self-regulation, body awareness or mindfulness. 
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Correlations 
However, there were correlations between the questionnaires. All results are reported in table 
VI. The MAAS and SRQ were significantly correlated; the BAQ was negatively correlated 
with the triggering and with the assessing subscale of SRQ and the SRS was not significantly 
related to any of the other questionnaires.  
Table V Modulators compared to Non-modulators on 
Questionnaires 
 t Sig. (2-tailed) 
SRQ score -1,682 ,113 
MAAS score ,618 ,545 
BAQ score 1,250 ,228 
SRS score -,758 ,459 
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Table VI  Correlations between Questionnaires 
  MAAS BAQ SRS 
SRQ  
Recei
ving 
SRQ  
Evalu
ating 
SRQ 
Trigg
ering 
SRQ  
Searc
hing 
SRQ  
Planni
ng 
SRQ  
Imple
menti
ng 
SRQ 
Asses
sing 
SRQ ,741** -,140 ,124 ,892
** -,090 ,641** ,643** ,748** ,667** ,663** 
MAAS 1 -,021 -,051 ,786** -,120 ,495* ,463 ,638** ,427 ,505* 
BAQ   1 ,247 -,247 -,061 -,485* ,097 ,116 ,072 -,508* 
SRS     1 -,061 -,153 -,078 ,243 ,210 ,325 -,237 
Notes: **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
Subjective Measures 
Each participant gave four subjective judgments after each TMS pulse. Each judgment was 
transformed into a Z-score. Moreover, we also computed an accuracy score for the amplitude 
and specificity questions.  
The amplitude accuracy score was the difference between the subjective amplitude’s Z-score 
and the objective measure’s Z-score (both for FDI and for distance), and this value was then 
transformed into an absolute value, indicating whether the participant had a tendency towards 
overestimating or underestimating the objective value related to their movement. Applying the 
absolute value transformation rendered a measure of the distance from a perfect judgment; the 
further the accuracy score is from 0, the worse the accuracy of that judgment was. 
Objective specificity was estimated as the Z-score of the ratio of the index movement (FDI) on 
the total movement (FDI + ADM). Specificity accuracy was then calculated in the same way 
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as amplitude accuracy: by calculating the difference between the subjective Z-score of 
specificity and the objective Z-score of specificity.  
Conditions 
Analyses of covariance were conducted on the four different subjective measures (control, 
agency, specificity and amplitude) in order to examine the effect of experimental condition on 
subjective experience. The experimental condition was a three level between subject factor 
and FDI MEP as well as distance measures were covariates. 
 
A first ANCOVA revealed that at equal movement, the feeling of control was different 
depending on the condition (F(2, 2657) = 13.125, p< .001, ηp2= .011). Pairwise comparisons 
with a Bonferroni correction revealed that the subjective level of control was not significantly 
different in the control and attention conditions (p= .822), but that it differed between the 
modulation and control conditions (p < .001) and between the modulation and attention 
conditions (p < .001). 
 
Another ANCOVA controlling for objective movement revealed that agency, on the other 
hand, was not significantly different between conditions (F (2, 2658) = 2,265, p> .05).  
A third ANCOVA revealed that participants judged amplitude differently depending on the 
condition they were in (F(2, 2657) = 7.304, p=.001, ηp2 = .005). Pairwise comparisons with a 
Bonferroni correction showed that amplitude judgments differed in the control vs attention 
conditions (p= .002) and control vs. modulation conditions (p=.005), but that attention and 
modulation are were similar in terms of amplitude judgment (p = 1).   
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A final ANCOVA revealed that specificity judgments followed the same pattern as amplitude 
judgments. They were significantly different between conditions (F(2, 2657) = 11.614, 
p<.001, ηp2 = .009). Pairwise comparisons with a Bonferroni correction reveal that control and 
attention differed, (p = .001), control and modulation differed, (p < .001), but attention and 
modulation did not differ (p = .810).  
Strategy 
Independent t-tests on accuracy and specificity measures comparing imagery with non-
imagery groups revealed that in the modulation condition, FDI or distance scores between 
imagery conditions revealed that the participants using an imagery strategy had a tendency to 
overestimate the specificity of the movement whereas in the non-imagery group, they 
underestimated it. Amplitude accuracy was not affected by strategy, no matter which objective 
measure (FDI or distance) was examined. These results can be seen in table VII. 
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Table VII Differences in Strategy on Subjective Measures of 
Specificity and Accuracy  
 Mean   t p 
 Imagery Non-imagery   
Specificity .438 -.214 -2.897 .01 
Amplitude 
Accuracy (FDI) 
.203 -.047 -1.099 .286 
Amplitude 
Accuracy 
(Distance) 
.220 .017 -.849 .408 
 
Modulators vs. non-modulators 
A mixed ANOVA revealed that there was no difference between those being able to modulate 
the FDI response and those that weren’t on subjective measures (F(3,16) = 1.723, p= .203). 
Conditions (without controlling for the objective movements) also had no effect on subjective 
response (F(6,13)=1.124, p= .401). There was also no interaction between modulators and 
conditions on the level of subjective experience (F(6,13) = 0.174 p= .979). Finally, there was 
no difference in specificity accuracy between modulators and non-modulators t(18) = -0.836, 
p> .05.  
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Discussion 
The present results show that reducing TMS-induced movements through intention and 
negative motor imagery was not possible in the present sample. However, the data show that 
there is great variability between individuals in their ability to modulate corticospinal 
excitability in M1 using these strategies (Figures 2.1 and 2.2). Seven out of 20 participants 
were able to reduce corticospinal excitability in the cortical representation of the FDI muscle. 
Six out of these seven were using a visual imagery strategy. Although an effort was made to 
elucidate what made modulators different from non-modulators, no conclusive results were 
found. Self-regulation, mindfulness or body awareness did not explain why some were more 
effective than others. Modulators were not more accurate in their judgments of the amplitudes 
or specificity of their movements, nor did they feel more in control or as an agent. 
These results conflict with what has been reported previously. Bonnard et al. (2003; 2009) as 
well as Sohn et al. (2003) showed that there is a general capability to down-regulate cortico-
spinal excitability in M1. However, contrasting with these studies, the current experiment 
attempted to examine the effect of pure negative motor imagery and intention and the 
subjective experience thereof. Therefore, a review of the differences with the aforementioned 
experiments may be beneficial to better understand discrepancies in results.  
First, a major difference lies in the fact that a previous study assessed corticospinal excitability 
during a voluntary movement. In their 2003 study, Bonnard et al. required participants to 
move their wrists to the beat of a metronome whereas in their 2009 study (Bonnard et al., 
2009), target muscles were tonically contracted.  
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A second major difference lies in the strategies used to downregulate corticospinal 
excitability. Instructions in the Bonnard et al. (2003; 2009) studies were similar to those used 
here for imagery: resist the TMS-induced movement using intention. Although intention was 
found to be effective in the Bonnard et al. (2003; 2009) studies, only 1 out of the 7 FDI 
modulators used the intention strategy effectively in the present study. On the other hand 6/7 
FDI modulators in the present study used negative visual imagery strategy. This strategy had 
never been examined before in this context. In fact, although Sohn et al. (2003) referred to 
their strategy as “negative motor imagery”, their instruction was “to imagine only suppression 
of TMS-induced twitching of your left hand by trying to do more relaxation only after No-Go 
signals and to imagine your left hand squeezing after Go signals” (Sohn et al., 2003). This 
strategy is closer to relaxation, and not motor imagery, generally defined as ”the simulation of 
a movement in one’s mind, without sending direct motor commands to the muscles” (Hétu et 
al., 2013). Their results thus replicate and corroborate those of Fujisawa et al. (2011), who 
showed that relaxation had a depressing effect on corticospinal excitability. Moreover, 
although visual negative motor imagery was explicitly examined, kinesthetic motor imagery 
was not. Some authors have suggested that kinesthetic motor imagery is more effective in 
modulating corticospinal excitability (Stinear et al., 2006). It is therefore important to note that 
5/10 participants in the motor imagery group reported using kinesthetic strategies as well. 
Indeed, they reported imagining that their hand was a statue or a block of ice as well as trying 
to imagine what it feels like to not move. This, however, had no effect on efficiency: 3/6 
successful imagery participants used visual imagery, whereas the other 3/6 used a combination 
of both visual and kinesthetic imagery.  
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A third important difference lies in the predictability of the TMS pulse. Bonnard et al. (2003; 
2009) used a paradigm where a cue would indicate the start of the trial, which was not the case 
in the present study. In fact, between trials, participants were asked to answer questions about 
their subjective experience and prepare for the next trial. The focused attention of participants 
and the relatively simple instructions in previous studies could have facilitated modulation 
effects. Indeed, because corticospinal excitability reflects a readiness to act, the object and 
level of one’s attention may impact corticospinal excitability. In the present paradigm, 
participants were asked to pay particular attention to the sensations in their hand in the 
attention condition. Results showed that the attention condition was not different from the 
control condition. Similarly to what was reported by Conte et al. (2008), attention did not 
modulate corticospinal excitability. However, in all conditions, participants were asked to pay 
attention so that they could answer 4 subjective questions after every TMS-induced 
movement. This led to 9/16 participants reporting that they found the control and attention 
conditions to be very similar. Furthermore, in the modulation condition, this may have 
detracted from the attention available for intention modulation or visual imagery.  
Although the specific contribution of attention to corticospinal excitability modulation could 
not be identified, further studies could elucidate the role of attention on corticospinal 
excitability by using a paradigm whereby attention is split on different loci or focused on an 
area of interest. Another approach would be to study corticospinal excitability in meditators, 
who are attention experts, while they are either doing a focused attention task, open 
monitoring (more focused on acceptance), and modulating their corticospinal excitability up or 
down. Comparing expert meditators to novice meditators group may help elucidate the 
mediating effects of attention on corticospinal excitability modulation.  
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Finally, differences in the number of trials may also partly explain discrepancies between the 
present study and those of Bonnard et al. (2003; 2009). In the latter, 120 to 160 trials per 
condition were conducted whereas in the present study 30 trials per condition were assessed. 
Because the effect size is not mentioned in either article, a possible explanation of discrepant 
results is that there may exist an effect of intention on CSE, but its effect is very small. Factors 
such as relaxation or worry, on the other hand, may hold greater explanatory power. In fact, as 
all the studies report, participants did not think that it would be possible to reduce the effects 
of TMS. The idea of attempting a seemingly impossible task may in fact be somewhat 
arousing or worrying, which we know increases corticospinal excitability (Oathes et al., 2008). 
The instruction to relax in the studies by Sohn et al. (2002; 2003) may have effectively 
counteracted this effect. In addition, Bonnard et al. (2003; 2009) took specific action to reduce 
this effect by giving both feedback and encouragement to their participants. In fact, the 
feedback would make this seemingly impossible task more controllable and the 
encouragement would also generally keep participants in a positive state, reducing the effects 
of worry. Participants in the present study, on the other hand, were given no feedback or 
encouragement.  
As was mentioned in the introduction, it is not clear whether positive motor imagery acts 
specifically on the muscle involved in the task. The present data suggest a similarly complex 
picture (Figure 1) for negative motor imagery. In total, 10 participants were able to modulate 
at least one of the measures (FDI, ADM or distance). Because subjective measures 
concentrated mostly on the “finger”, not specifically referring to the index, some participants 
may have taken this as “in the index finger”, others may have not. However, when participants 
asked for clarification, it was specified that the index finger was the target. It is therefore not 
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clear what participants pictured in their head as they were performing motor imagery, which 
may explain some of the variability in the results. Moreover, it is possible that negative 
imagery is actively used in positive imagery. In fact, when one pictures his/her index moving, 
one also pictures the rest of the hand remaining still as a backdrop.  Examining whether a 
control muscle diminishes in amplitude between a control condition and a modulation 
condition may reveal the prevalence of this mechanism. On the other hand, during negative 
motor imagery, the image most likely does not have a foreground and a background. The 
whole hand might be pictured as still. This may render the process less vivid and thus less 
powerful. In fact, the ability to visualize a movement has been shown to be correlated with the 
ability to modulate corticospinal excitability (Williams et al., 2012). To our knowledge, this 
relationship has not been tested in downward regulation of corticospinal excitability. Although 
an interesting research avenue, the visualization ability of participants was not measured.  
Mental rotation abilities, motor experience, age, gender (Williams et al., 2012), practice 
effects and the recruitment of certain brain areas (Guillot al., 2008) have all been linked to 
superior motor imagery ability in paradigms studying positive motor imagery. These factors 
may explain some of the variance that was found between participants. On the other hand, the 
hypothesis that self-regulation, mindfulness and body awareness may be related to the ability 
to decrease the effect of a TMS-induced twitch was not confirmed. Indeed, no significant 
relationship between scores on the four questionnaires and a superior ability to modulate 
corticospinal excitability was found. This absence of significant effects may be explained by 
numerous factors. First, the SRQ measures the very general skill of conducting behavioral 
change in one’s life, which may be too general to have a significant impact on the very precise 
type of regulation observed therein. Second, the SRS measures the ability to regulate one’s 
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attention during a specific task. In our paradigm, this was an important skill as participants had 
to switch their attention from the subjective report task to the intention or motor imagery task. 
However, it was not related to the ability to modulate the TMS-induced twitch. Similarly, the 
MAAS, which measures the ability to stay aware in the present moment, may be associated 
with the modulation of corticospinal excitability, but it is not directly responsible for it. Future 
studies should aim at determining whether a high score on the SRS or MAAS mediates the 
link between the vividness of imagery questionnaire and the ability to  modulate corticospinal 
excitability. Finally, the BAS, measuring the awareness of non-emotional processes in the 
body, indicates deeper processing of kinesthetic information. Because a kinesthetic motor 
imagery strategy was not observed here, further studies are needed to understand the link 
between body awareness and kinesthetic motor imagery.  In sum, the measures used in this 
experiment all assess processes related to the localization of attention or the modulation 
thereof, which were not shown to explain the ability to modulate corticospinal excitability.  
The present study was the first to assess the subjective experience of MEP down-regulation. It 
yielded some interesting results. The present data corroborated the results of Chambon et al. 
(2012) by showing that the experience of control, defined not as the production of the 
movement (which would be agency), but as whether the movement was controlled, increased 
in the modulation condition – no matter if participants actually succeeded in controlling the 
movement or not. On the other hand, the experience of agency did not change across 
conditions. This can be interpreted in the following manner: participants knew that they were 
not the initiators of the movement, but they did feel like they could control it once it started, 
but only when they had a task to complete with the movement. Interestingly, the strategy used 
affected judgments of amplitude. When participants used visual the imagery strategy, they 
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judged the movements as bigger than they actually were. It is possible that when participants 
had to imagine the absence of movement, any movement appeared much bigger in contrast. 
Furthermore, analysis of the subjective judgments highlighted a methodological problem with 
amplitude judgments. Amplitude was judged as higher in the control condition than in the 
other two. This is likely due to habituation effects. As involuntary movements of greater 
amplitude are experienced, the subjective scale may shrink in comparison, highlighting the 
potential need for longer practice runs when studying judgments of amplitude. 
This experiment may have yielded inconclusive results because of certain methodological 
issues as well. First, the subjective questions participants had to answer after every stimulation 
may have influenced their ability to concentrate on the modulation task. Additionally, 
participants were not told when stimulation would occur. Implicitly, they had to be ready as 
soon as they had answered the four subjective questions. Yet, because the TMS coil was hand-
held, it was impossible to control both for exact coil position and stable time between trials. In 
Bonnard’s (2003; 2009) as well as in Sohn’s (2002; 2003) experiments, there was a 
preparation cue and the pulses were somewhat predictable. The mental preparation could thus 
be done in a more focused way. Also, it is possible that right after they answered the four 
subjective questions, their mental focus was still on the movement that had just occurred – a 
case of positive imagery rather than negative imagery.  
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Documents Spéciaux 
Appendixe 1 – Questions subjectives après chaque essai 
 
1……………………....À……………………100 
Totalement en désaccord    Totalement en accord 
 
1.#Agentivité! C'est!moi!qui!ai!produit!le!mouvement!de!mon!doigt!
2.#Propriété! C'est!mon!doigt!qui!a!bougé!(par!rapport!à!ma!main)!
3.#Contrôle! J’étais!en!contrôle!du!mouvement!de!mon!doigt!
4.#Amplitude!
Le!mouvement!de!mon!doigt!était!à!son!amplitude!
maximale!
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Appendixe 2 – Certificat d’éthique 
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Text
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Appendixe 3 – Formulaire de consentement 
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Appendixe 4 – Questions subjectives entre les conditions 
 
Question Pas du tout - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Totalement 
A quel point aviez-vous 
l'impression de pouvoir 
anticiper les mouvements de 
votre doigt 
1        2        3        4        5        6        7 
Combien de contrôle aviez-
vous l'impression d'avoir sur 
les mouvements de votre 
doigt 
1        2        3        4        5        6        7 
A quel point ressentiez-vous 
que vous bougiez 
volontairement votre doigt 
1        2        3        4        5        6        7 
A quel point ressentiez-vous 
que vous étiez l'instigateur 
des mouvements de votre 
doigt 
1        2        3        4        5        6        7 
 
  
 xix 
Appendixe 5 – Questionnaire post-expérimental 
1.!Quelles!stratégies!avezCvous!utilisées!afin!de!tenter!de!moduler!l’amplitude!de!vos!mouvements?!
2.!EstCce!que!certaines!stratégies!vous!semblaient!plus!efficaces!que!d’autres?!
3.!Quelles!stratégies!avezCvous!utilisées!afin!de!porter!attention!à!vos!mouvements?!
4.!Quelles!stratégies!avezCvous!utilisées!lors!des!essais!où!vous!deviez!rester!passif?!
5.!Comment!feriezCvous!la!distinction!entre!vos!stratégies!dans!les!différentes!conditions?!
6.!AvezCvous!ressenti!une!forme!d’inconfort!pendant!l’expérimentation?!
7.!AvezCvous!d’autres!commentaires?!
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Appendixe 6 – Questionnaires 
Appendixe 6a – Mindful Attention Awareness Scale (MAAS) Traduction française telle que 
cité dans: 
Jermann, F., Billieux, J., Larøi, F., d’ Argembeau, A., Bondolfi, G., Zermatten, A., & Van der 
Linden, M. (2009). Mindful Attention Awareness Scale (MAAS): Psychometric 
properties of the French translation and exploration of its relations with emotion 
regulation strategies. Psychological assessment, 21(4), 506-14. doi:10.1037/a0017032 
 
Appendixe 6b – Self-Regulation Schedule (SRSc) Traduction française validée. Basé sur: 
Brown, J. M., Miller, W. R., & Lawendowski, L. A. (1999). The Self-Regulation 
Questionnaire. In L. VandeCreek & T. L. Jackson (Eds.), Innovations in clinical 
practice: A source book (Vol. 17, pp. 281-289). Sarasota, FL: Professional Resource 
Press. 
 
Appendixe 6c – Body Awareness Questionnaire (BAS) Traduction française validée. Basé sur: 
Shields, S. A., Mallory, M. E., & Simon, A. (1989). The Body Awareness Questionnaire: 
Reliability and Validity , Awareness Questionnaire$: Reliability and Validity. Journal 
of Personality Assessment, 53(4), 802-813. 
 
Appendixe 6d – Self-Regulation Scale (SRS) Traduction française validée (Miquelon et al., 
2012), basé sur : 
Schwarzer, R., Diehl, M., & Schmitz, G.S. (1999) The Self-Regulation Scale. Berlin: Freie 
Universitat, Gesundheitspsychologie. 
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Appendix 6a – Mindfulness Awareness Attention Scale (MAAS) 
Question Presque                      Presque Toujours                       Jamais 
1 Il m’arrive d’éprouver une émotion et de ne pas en prendre conscience avant un certain temps. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2 Je casse ou renverse des choses parce que je suis inattentif(ve) ou parce que je pense à autre chose. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3 J’ai des difficultés à rester concentré(e) sur ce qui se passe dans le présent. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4 J’ai tendance à marcher rapidement pour me rendre là où je veux aller, sans prêter attention à ce qui se passe durant le trajet. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5 
J’ai tendance à ne pas remarquer des sensations de tension 
physique ou d’inconfort jusqu’à ce qu’elles captent vraiment mon 
attention. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6 J’oublie le nom d’une personne presque immédiatement après l’avoir entendu pour la première fois. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7 Il me semble que je fonctionne « en mode automatique » sans être très conscient(e) de ce que je fais. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
8 Je fais les choses très rapidement sans y prêter vraiment attention. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
9 Je suis tellement focalisé(e) sur le but que je veux atteindre que je perds de vue ce que je suis en train de faire pour y parvenir. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
10 Je fais des travaux ou des tâches de manière automatique, sans me rendre compte de ce que je suis en train de faire. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
11 Je me surprends à écouter quelqu’un d’une oreille tout en faisant autre chose. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
12 Je me déplace en voiture « en pilotage automatique » et il m’arrive d’être étonné(e) de me retrouver là où je suis. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
13 Je me surprends à être préoccupé(e) par l’avenir ou le passé. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
14 Je me surprends à effectuer des choses sans y prêter attention. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
15 Je grignote sans réaliser que je suis en train de manger. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
